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"SOLDIER'S HEART": THE REDEFINITION OF
HEART DISEASE AND SPECIALITY FORMATION




Studies of the social construction of diseases have clearly demonstrated how
"non-medical" factors such as race, class, and gender are instrumental in their
definition. However, less attention has been paid to how changing concepts of
disease have interacted withpolitical, military, andeconomicforcesintheshapingof
medical specialities. In this paper, I shall discuss how the disorder called "soldier's
heart" was redefined by British physicians during and shortly after World War I.
Heart disease in soldiers was known by several names, including DaCosta's
syndrome (referring to a set ofsymptomsdescribed during the American CivilWar),
irritable heart, and DAH (disordered action of the heart).' I will not attempt to
answer definitively the question, "what was soldier's heart?".2 Indeed, I seriously
doubt that the question even has an answer.3 Rather, I will use soldier's heart as a
window through which to examine changing disease definitions, the structure of
medical research, and the development of specialized medical societies in the early
twentieth century. I will argue that because heart disease in soldiers was the third
leading cause of discharge from the British Army in the First World War, it became
the focus ofattention for military physicians in special hospitals set up to attempt to
solve the problem.4 These physicians redefined the disease. The new disease, the
effortsyndrome, wasmoreconsistent bothwith acutewartime exigencies andwith an
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1 Or a variety of other names. I will attempt to use the names appropriate for each period being
discussed, but do not mean to imply that one or the other is "correct".
2For an interesting perspective, see Charles F. Wooley, 'Where are the diseases of yesteryear?
DaCosta's syndrome, soldier's heart, the effort syndrome, neurocirculatory asthenia and the mitral valve
prolapse syndrome', Circulation, 1976, 53: 749-751; and 'From irritable heart to mitral valve prolapse:
the Oslerconnection',Amer. J. Cardiology, 1984,53: 870-874. Thomas N. Jameslinkssoldier's heartand
mitral valve prolapse through dysautonomia in 'SirThomas Lewis redivivus: from pebbles ina quiet pond
to autonomic storms', Br. Heart J., 1984, 52: 1-23.
3 John Gabbay provides an excellent synopsis of the problems inherent in attacking such a problem in
his 'Asthma attacked? Tactics for the reconstruction of a disease concept', in Peter Wright and Andrew
Treacher (editors), The problem ofmedical knowledge. Examining the social construction ofmedicine,
Edinburgh University Press, 1982, pp. 23-48.
4Thomas Lewis, The soldier's heart and the effort syndrome, London, Shaw, 1918, p. 1.
34"Soldier's heart"
ongoingtransformation ofthe concept ofheart disease from static and anatomical to
dynamic and physiological. In the second part ofthis paper, I shall describe how the
effort syndrome acted as a nidus for development of the Cardiac Club and the
beginning of cardiology in Great Britain.
NINETEENTH-CENTURY IDEAS ABOUT HEART DISEASE IN SOLDIERS
Although the problem of heart disease among soldiers in the British Army was
reformulated in the early twentieth century, the issue itself had been evaluated
earlier within the anatomical, mechanical framework of nineteenth-century British
medicine. Heart disease had first attracted official attention when soldiers from all
parts of the world were brought to the Royal Victoria Hospital, Netley, which
opened in 1863.5 In 1864, a government committee was appointed to study heart
conditions in the army.6 It met yearly from 1864 to 1868, and concluded that the
commonly used kit, which weighed, for heavy marching order, somewhat over sixty
pounds, restricted the heart's action and thusproduced heartdisease. Army Medical
School professors agreed, issuing a report on the appropriate type ofpack, stressing
the necessity for avoiding "all impediments to the fullest expansion ofthe lungs, and
to the action of the heart" (and noting the superiority of the Prussian pack).7 They
held that unnecessary chest compression led to cardiac hypertrophy, with resulting
dilatation andvalvular derangement, and the eventual appearance ofacharacteristic
"soldier's spot" on the inevitable post-mortem examination.
In 1870, the issue of the cause of heart disease in soldiers remained important
enough for the Alexander Memorial Fund to select for its first Prize Essay "the
aetiology and prevalence of diseases of the heart among soldiers as compared with
the civilpopulations ofthosecountriesinwhich they are calledupontoserve, andthe
means ofprevention or mitigation-due regard being had to the conditions in which
the soldier is unavoidably placed". The prize went to Assistant-Surgeon Arthur
Myers, who recommended a simple remedy: allow the men to open their jackets. In
his prize-winning essay, he admonished commanding officers for wanting their men
to look "smart and set up" at the expense of their health.8
Two years later, Francis Moinet looked for a cause of cardiac disease other than
the soldier's clothing and gear. Reasoning from the mechanical relationships of the
heart and aorta, Moinet argued that excessive rifle drills obstructed cardiac outflow.
He pointed out that this argument explained the observed preponderance of aortic
valve lesions in soldiers.9 Surgeon Arthur Davy agreed that obstruction was the
primary cause of heart disease in soldiers, although he thought the obstruction was
due to the "setting-up drill", which produced a dilated chest and therefore abnormal
5 W.C. MacClean, 'Diseases of the heart in the British army: the cause and the remedy', Br. med. J.,
1867, i: 161-164.
6 R. MacN. Wilson, 'The irritable heart of soldiers', ibid., 1916, i: 119-120.
MacClean, op. cit., note 5 above.
Arthur B.R. Myers, On the etiology andprevalence ofdiseases ofthe heart amongsoldiers, London,
Churchill, 1870.
9 Francis W. Moinet,A treatiseonthecauses ofheartdisease withachapteronthereasonofitsprevalence
in the army, Edinburgh, Bell & Bradfote, 1872, summarized in 'A cause of heart disease in the army',
Edinb. med. J., 1871, 17: 505-511.
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action of the heart.10 The Irish Surgeon-Major, William Riordan, also rejected
uniforms as the problem. However, he linked the hypertrophy of the soldier's heart
with its displacement during position drills, labourers being more accustomed to a
different way of standing."1 For Riordan, the chief "affectation" was palpitation.
Palpitationincreased the powerofthe heart, andthisin turn produced aneurism. He
advised the army not only to change drill habits but also to pay more attention to
personal comforts for the recruit in order to make him happier in his new, military
surroundings.
These nineteenth-century studies of heart disease in British soldiers all shared a
similar conception, that the problem was pnrmarily hypertrophy, valvular lesions,
and aortic dilatation-all mechanical lesions that admitted only a mechanical cause,
usually some form of obstruction to the heart's outflow. The only question was the
aetiology of that obstruction-either stylish uniforms, poorly designed drills, or
compression of the thoracic cage by drill or altered work habits.
These formulations, based firmly on a mechanical understanding of the heart,
shared twootherimplicitcharacteristics. First,theywereofnovalueinidentifying an
affected individual so that he might be treated or cured. Hypertrophy, valvular
disease, and aortic aneurism were permanent conditions. Once the diagnosis was
made, there was little to be done for the individual soldier. The authors of these
studiescouldonlyadvise the armytoalteritstreatmentofallsoldiersinthehopethat
fewer men would become ill.
Although all of these experts considered the role ofvices, primarily tobacco and
spirits, aspossible underlying causes, they concluded that the increased incidence of
heart disease in soldiers required some other explanation. This led to the second
assumption: that recruits were healthy, by-and-large, and thattherefore the cause of
disease laysomewhere inthearmy's treatment ofthese men. EarlyintheFirst World
War, the idea that heart disease was due to a static mechanical defect caused by the
army's training methods was to be severely questioned.
EARLY WAR WORK
In 1908, JamesMackenzie, whowouldeventuallyplay apivotal roleindeveloping
ideas about soldier's heart, included the disease in the first edition ofhisDiseases of
theheart in the section on "increasedfrequency ofthe heart'saction".'2 The disease
was found not only in soldiers, Mackenzie claimed, but also in "workpeople subject
to severe muscular exertion", and was associated with free use of alcohol and a
tendency to obesity. Sir Clifford Allbutt, the Regius Professor of Physic at
Cambridge, also thought that "muscular exertion" was the determining cause of
10 F. Arthur Davy,'Acontribution totheetiology ofheart disease', inArmyMedicalDepartmentreport
for the year 1876, vol. 18, London, HMSO, 1877.
" William E. Riordan, Thecauses oforigin ofheartdisease andaneurism in the army, Dublin, Fannin,
1878.
" Oxford, p. 126. Forbiographies ofJames Mackenzie, see R. MacNairWilson, Thebelovedphysician,
New York, Macmillan, 1926; andAlex Mair,SirJamesMackenzie, M.D. 1853-1925:generalpractitioner,
Edinburgh and London, Churchill Livingstone, 1973.
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soldier's heart.13 Although he considered that exercise need not lead to cardiac
disease, he warned the "overfed and self-indulgent person" against suddenly
attempting vigorous physical activity. Allbutt saw the prognosis for soldiers as bad;
most remained in hospital until invalided out of the service.
By describing the disease in this fashion, both Allbutt and Mackenzie rejected
nineteenth-century theories linking soldier's heart with causative factors found
exclusively within the army. Although theirdescriptions reflected a shift in attitudes
about soldier'sheart, neitherpaid anyspecial attention tothe disease until the Great
War. When German troops marched into Belgium inthe summerof 1914, there was
already a significant literature on diseases of the heart in soldiers. Not that this
seemed a particularly urgent problem at first. "Home by Christmas" was the cry.
But, as the war dragged on, devastating new entities like poison gas, machine guns,
and barbed wire presented physicians with hitherto unknown medical concerns.
Heartdisease firstattractedseriousattentionfollowingtheAugust 1914retreatfrom
Mons, which saw many soldiers sent back to England with chest pain, dyspnoea,
palpitations on exertion, and tachycardia.14 It eventually became the third leading
cause of discharge from the British Army during the war'.5 ("Chest complaints"
comprised the second most common cause for discharge, about the same order of
magnitude as "heart disease".) Although falling far below "wounds and injuries" in
terms ofabsolute numbers, patients with heart disease seemed to constitute a group
with which far more could be accomplished, both before and after enlistment.
Thus, the war acted to focus official attention on the problem of soldier's heart.
Eventually, that attention was to be directed to the soldier sent back from the front,
but atfirst, the problem the armyfaced wasthat ofassessing thephysicalcondition of
recruits. Nearly a million men signed up in the initial burst ofpatriotic fervour, and
noserious attemptwasmadetoassesstheirmedicalcondition."6 Traumawasdifficult
to predict, but it became clearthat the examining medical officer needed to evaluate
carefully the cardiac status of any potential soldier. In so doing, he faced a serious
practical problem. He could not admit someone with a manifestly damaged heart
that was bound to fail, but did murmurs and irregularity always indicate severe
damage? Thisproblem, the "superstition that aheart to be normal must befree from
murmurs and irregularity", as Mackenzie put it, prompted the first organized
medical attention to heart disease in the army.17
The autumn of 1915 sawJamesMackenzie'sfirstmemorandum onsoldier'sheart,
a briefguide both distributed bythe WarOffice andpublishedbytheBritish Medical
Journal.18 Mackenzie saw as the primary issue thefunctional efficiency of the heart
13 T. Clifford Allbutt, 'Soldier's heart', in Thomas Clifford Allbutt (editor), A system ofmedicine by
many writers, London, Macmillan, 1905, vol. 5, pp. 851-855.
14 John Hay, 'Cardio-vascular disorders', in W.G. MacPherson, W.P. Herringham, T.R. Elliot, and A.
Balfour (editors),History ofthe Great War, Vol 1: Medicalservices. Diseases ofthe war, London, HMSO,
1923.
15 Lewis, op. cit., note 4 above.
16 Anthony Babington, For the sake of example, capital courts-material 1914-1920, New York, St
Martin's Press, 1983, p. 8 and p. 204; A.J.P. Taylor, English history 1914-1945, New York, Oxford
University Press, 1965, p. 20.
17 James Mackenzie, 'The recruit's heart', Br. med. J., 1915, ii: 807-808.
18 James Mackenzie, 'The recruit's heart. A memorandum for medical examiners', ibid., pp. 563-564,
also distributed as a separate sheet, 1693 (A.M.D.2).
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(italics in original). Murmurs and irregularities were important only if they
diminished the functional efficiency. If they did not, and this was to be ascertained
either by asking the candidate how much exertion he was accustomed to or by
observing him undergoing exertion without distress, then the candidate's heart was
sound and he was fit for duty. Nowhere in this memorandum did Mackenzie use the
term "valvular lesions".
This shift of focus from precise, anatomical lesions of the heart to general
assessment of its global function was quite consistent with the "new cardiology" of
the early twentieth century. As would be expected, those who objected to
Mackenzie's approach based their arguments on the importance of murmurs as
indicators ofvalvular lesions. They quite clearly saw the primary cause forrejection
asthe mechanical defect, the abnormal valve, ratherthanthe "functional efficiency"
of the "new cardiology". In opposing the "new teachings of the past twenty-five
years", some chose merely to republish their earlier, 1890 teachings.19 However,
Mackenzie and other proponents of the "new cardiology" both defined the
increasingly accepted intellectual approach and, perhaps most important, quickly
came to control the organized, governmental approach to the problem of soldier's
heart.
The autumn of 1915 also brought a worsening military situation. The failure at
Gallipoli was well under way, and in September, the disastrous attack at Loos
resulted in an additional 50,000 casualties with very little gained. It was becoming
obvious that the front would probably remain static throughout the winter and that
the warcould be alongone. In November, casualties sent back toUniversity College
Hospital, London, complaining of chest pain, breathlessness, palpitations,
exhaustion, and giddiness prompted Thomas Lewis and his colleagues to write an
"urgent" lettertotheBritish MedicalJournal.20Thisletterraised adifferentproblem
from that mentioned in Mackenzie's memorandum on the evaluation of recruits.
Lewis had studied a group of soldiers sent from the front with "cardiac strain" or
disordered heart action. These men complained of chest pain, breathlessness,
palpitation, and fatigue. On examination, there was usually evidence of vasomotor
instability. Afterexcluding those who seemed likely to have structural heart damage
by virtue of a past history of rheumatic fever, chorea, or syphilis, Lewis and his
colleagues identified agroup in which the symptoms appeared to be caused by toxins
produced by staphylococcal orstreptococcal infections. Theirs was not to be the first
wartime speculation on the cause of such symptoms in soldiers.
TheBritish MedicalJournal publishedseveral lettersonthetopicoverthe nextfew
months. Most observers agreed that few soldiers did have clear-cut valvular disease
seriously impairing the heart's action, andforthe othersthe primary cause ofcardiac
symptoms and signs did not lie in the heart itself. Early ideas about the aetiology of
"irritable heart" reflected the most exciting developments in clinical medicine over
19 James Kingston Fowler, 'Auscultation of the heart of the recruit', ibid., 1915, ii: 744-745. For the
debate over murmurs, the new cardiology, and the recruit's heart, see also Alexander Morison, 'The
recruit's heart', ibid., 1915, ii: 636-637; W. Gordon, 'Murmurs in the recruit's heart', ibid., 1916, i:
433-434; and Mackenzie, op. cit., note 17 above.
20 Thomas Lewis, Thomas Cotton, and F.H. Thiele, 'A note on the "irritable heart" of soldiers', ibid.,
1915, ii: 722.
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The figure shows a 28-year-old patient with a face typical of "DAH" (disordered action ofthe heart),
one ofthe many terms used to describe soldier's heart. The picture was taken afterfifteen minutes ofeasy
exercise, and shows dilated nostrils, furrowed forehead, slightly opened mouth, and the general
expression of fatigue and anxiety. These feature were common to the desciption of both DAH and
soldier's heart, and were given special attention as useful diagnostic features. From Thomas Lewis, 'The
tolerance of physical exertion as shown by soldiers suffering from so-called "irritable heart",' Br. med.
J., 1918, i: 364."Soldier's heart"
the pastdecade orso: thediscovery ofcirculating hormones and establishment ofthe
new field of endocrinology, and the rapid progress of microbiology in identifying
bacteria and associating them with specific human diseases. Some suggested that
hyperthyroidism was the cause of the disease. Infections were sought in several
locations and were postulated as the cause through a variety of mechanisms. The
infection did not need to be coincident with onset of symptoms. It could precede
them by months or years, or it could be a smouldering invasion by micro-organisms,
such as tuberculosis bacilli, that had yet to become apparent.
Howevermodern newideaslike excessive glandularsecretions orinfectioustoxins
may have seemed, they were oflittle help in dealing with the acute problemposedby
the war and soldier's heart. The older theories, revolving around improper drill and
poorly designed uniforms, at least held out easy, obvious approaches to prevention
and treatment. Remove theinciting cause; change the constricting uniform; stop the
offending drill. The newer theories were more consistent with changes in medical
thinking, such as the "new cardiology", but they made both prevention and
treatment seem more difficult. It was not so easy to cure infections or
hyperthyroidism. X-rays were a possible treatment for the latter, but few actually
thought that more than a very small percentage of the soldiers being returned were
suffering from hyperthyroidism.21 Treatment for infections was limited to
"increasing the general health of the body in such a way as to increase the natural
resistance toinfection".22Thiswasfairly non-specifictherapy, andunlikelyrapidlyto
replenish casualties from the front.
Early in 1916, Sir James Mackenzie opened a session of the Section of
Therapeutics ofthe RoyalSociety ofMedicine with apaperon 'Thesoldier's heart'.23
In it, he discussed the examination ofsome 400 soldiers invalided with heart disease.
Mackenzie thought that the cases were overwhelmingly non-cardiac, the most likely
aetiology being the strain and exhaustion of life in the trenches superimposed on
some "toxicinfluence" caused byinfection. He declined tospeculate ontreatment of
the bacterial invasion (other than to suggest the possibility ofvaccine therapy), but
focused on uplifting the soldier's generally depressed mental and physical state
through exercise. For officers in his private practice, Mackenzie advised "fishing,
riding, shooting, golf' (the last a particular personal favourite ofMackenzie's), and
he urged the same kind of "congenial exercise" for lower ranks. Lest his motives be
misunderstood, he emphasized the need for "not only.., the pleasure of the
sideman, but so that the soldier may speedily regain his health and return the sooner
to his duties".
RESEARCH AT HAMPSTEAD AND COLCHESTER
Swift return to duties was the goal for most wartime agencies involved with
invalided soldiers. With this priority, it is hardly surprising that the structure
necessary to implement Mackenzie's suggestions was not long in coming. Once
21 There was notable absence of support for James Barr's vitriolic writing on hyperthyroidism as the
obvious cause for solidier's heart.
22'The soldier's heart', ibid., 1916, i: 137.
23 Sir James Mackenzie, 'The soldier's heart', ibid., 1917, i: 117-19.
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established, the wards, hospitals, and groups started for one specific purpose
developed a momentum and motivation of their own. Shortly after the onset of
World War I the War Office had set aside a few beds in the military wards at
University College Hospital for research on soldier's heart.' In the winter of
1914-15, the energetic young London physician, Captain Thomas Lewis, took
charge of these beds. Lewis's appointment probably was in large part due to the
effortsofMackenzie, aclosefriendandprofessionalcolleague ofLewis. Mackenzie's
earlier work withthe polygraph haddone more than make him aprominentfigure in
British medicine, one who could influence the War Department to establish a new
hospital as well asto help run it. He had also helped to popularize the use ofgraphic
records, such as the polygraph and the electrocardiogram (ECG), in the study of
heart diseases. By so doing, he enabled Thomas Lewis, whose credentials lay
primarily in the mastery of these instrumental methods, to be placed in charge of
soldier's heart research. Lewis was eventually, in February 1916, appointed to the
permanent scientific staff of the Medical Research Committee (MRC) to pursue
clinical research.25
Although Lewis had been studying the heart since around 1906, lack offinancial
support forresearch obliged him to continue to see private patients. He received the
first Beit Memorial Fellowship for Medical Research in 1910, and in 1911 was
named "Honorary Officer in Charge of the Cardiographic Department" at
University College Hospital.'M The honour of the title should not obscure the fact
that Lewis still needed personal funds to purchase instruments, which he used in a
basement broom-closet. While Mackenzie had a reputation as a master clinician,
Lewis owed what medical standing he could claim to his work with the ECG. The
ECG atfirstappeared tobe apromisingtool,andthe MRC,whichsupported Lewis's
work on soldier's heart from the beginning ofthe war, noted in itsfirst annual report
thatcardiographicapparatuswouldbemade availableforthestudyofsoldier'sheart.
Butdespite itsearly appeal, the ECG wastoplay nosignificant roleinresearch on or
treatment of heart disease in soldiers.
In 1915, Mackenzie had suggested to the War Office that a special hospital be
established fortreatment ofpatientswith soldier's heart.27 Nearthe endofthatyear,
the WarOfficeimplementedthisideaandtransferredLewis'swork onsoldier's heart
from University College Hospital to the Mount Vernon Hospitalin Hampstead. The
Hampstead hospitalwasdirectedbyadistinguishedadvisorycommittee consisting of
Sir Clifford Allbutt, Sir William Osler, and Sir James Mackenzie. In September
1916, the War Office decided to have heart cases sent directly to Hampstead from
France,notindirectly through otherhospitals in GreatBritain, By 1917, theincrease
in cases forced a move to larger facilities at Colchester.
N Medical Research Committee Annual Report (hereinafter MRCAR), 1914-15, 1: 44. There is no
full-scale biography of Thomas Lewis. The most complete obituary is A.N. Drury and R.T. Grant,
'ThomasLewis',ObituaryNoticesoftheFellowsoftheRoyalSociety, 1945-8,5: 179-202. Seealso, Arthur
Hollman, 'Thomas Lewis-the early years', Br. Heart J., 1981, 46: 233-244.
'5MRCAR, 1915-16, 2: 17.
se Druryand Grant, op. cit., note 24above,p. 182; W.R. Merrington, University CollegeHospitalandits
Medical School: a history, London, Heinemann, 1976, p. 193.
27 Sir James Mackenzie to John Parkinson, 3 December 1915, in Mair, op. cit., note 12 above, p. 63.
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Although one goal of the War Office was the rapid diagnosis and discharge of
soldiers with serious heart disease, Mackenzie's work made them hope that this
group of soldiers would constitute a relatively small proportion of those sent to the
hospital. The hospital was intended instead for the larger group, those with "true
irritable heart". The MRC and the War Office hoped that by bringing together a
large number of these cases "many [more] might be returned to duty more rapidly
by treatment with suitable and graduated exercises, than when remaining as
independent cases scattered through military and convalescent hospitals; and it was
expected at the same time that the cases found not amenable to treatment should,
without prolonged delay, either be sent to appropriate light duty or be permanently
invalided".28
By 1916, it was clear to the British government that the war was going to last a
good deallongerthan thefewmonthsanticipated atitsonset. Theincreasing needfor
manpower led to conscription, an unprecedented and unpopular decision in a
country which had previously seen little governmental influence on daily life.29 Such
a drastic move made the needforaccurate medicalevaluation ofsoldiers seem all the
moreimportant. Thediagnosis and treatment ofsoldierswithcardiaccomplaints was
still in turmoil, and many military physicians had little patience with soldiers
suffering from poorly defined complaints of any type.30
The goal of the staff at Hampstead was the swift differentiation of those soldiers
who could be sent back to the front from those who should be quickly discharged. In
pursuit of this aim, the hospital received not only an ample supply of soldiers with
suspected heart disease but also generous resources and whatever technical and
professional personnel were required. Establishment of this hospital also played a
key role in furthering the career ofThomas Lewis, who, in turn, was to be a premier
figure in the maturation of the post-war Medical Research Committee (called the
Medical Research Council after 1920).
In February 1917, the MRC published an early summary by Lewis ofits research
findings.3" This report was based on study of about 1,000 soldiers diagnosed as
having soldier's heart. The crucial feature of this report is that the symptoms and
signs that might once have been interpreted as pointing to structural change andipso
facto have been sufficient reason for an invalidity ticket, were now assessed in terms
of the heart's total functional capacity. Primary symptoms of this disorder included
breathlessness, pain, exhaustion, giddiness, and fainting-a constellation of
symptoms that were merely "exaggerated manifestations of healthy responses to
effort".32 The MRC report therefore advocated the diagnostic term "effort
syndrome" for most of these cases. The report described evaluation by graded
exercises, with the emphasis placed on establishing prognosis, not diagnosis, and one
28 MRCAR, 1915-16, 2: 58.
29 Although of tremendous symbolic importance, the draft actually failed to provide more men for the
army. Taylor, op. cit., note 16 above, p. 55.
30 Babington, op. cit., note 16 above, esp. p. 60.
31 'Report upon soldiers returned as cases of "disordered action of the heart" (D.A.H.) or "valvular
diseases of the heart" (V.D.H.)', MRCSpecial Report Series, no. 8, 1917. No author listed, but Thomas
Lewis cited as author in MRCAR, 1916-17, 3: 77.
32 MRC Special Report 8, op. cit., note 31 above, p. 7.
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simple objective: rapid return to duty when possible, rapid discharge when the
disease was too severe. The financial importance of the latter is obvious when one
considersthatsoldiersinvalided with heart disease spent an"averageperiodofnearly
five and halfmonths in hospitals".33 Graded exercises did more than merely serve a
diagnostic function, they were therapeutic as well. By gradually increasing the
intensity of the effort, and by rewarding a soldier's successful performance at each
increment of exertion, fifty per cent of soldiers with effort syndrome could be
returned to duty after an average stay of only 1.5 months in the Hampstead
hospital.34
Four observations can be made about this research on soldier's heart. First, as
intimated above, the economic implications of reclassification were never far from
the top on a list ofjustifications forsuch research. The dramaticreduction in hospital
stay, from an average of 5.5 months to an average of 1.5 months, saved
approximately £50,000 a year, almost as much as the entire MRC budget.35
Moreover, as will be discussed in greater detail below, the government anticipated
early in the war the profound impact any method for establishing the level of
disability would have on pensions assessment, and studiesofsoldier's heart explicitly
reflected this need.36
Second, despite the early appeal of graphic methods to many who worked at the
military hospitals, neither the polygraph nor the ECG was found to be valuable in
sorting out soldiers with possible heart disease. Lewis thought his own ECG was of
"little or no value".37 This conclusion came despite the close connexion many of
those involved had enjoyed with medical instruments: Allbutt had introduced
routine use of the thermometer and the ophthalmoscope; Mackenzie had reached
prominence in large part through his work with the polygraph; similarly Thomas
Lewis and the ECG. For Lewis, the message was particularly clear. By 1914, he had
attracted slight attention and very little financial support for ECG research; by the
end of the war he was credited with saving vast sums of money and, perhaps more
important, he wasinthe full-time employofthe MRCto pursue hisresearch. Thomas
Lewis was knighted in 1921, not for his basic research on the ECG, but for his work
during the war on the effort syndrome. If the clinical approach to breathless soldiers
was to be easily incorporated into the contemporary medical system, it needed an
easily appreciable, non-instrumental basis.
The third generalization about the entity, effort syndrome, is that such a concept
should fit easily into the "new cardiology" of the day. Physicians at Hampstead and
Colchester directed attention away from local, particular valvular defects,
de-emphasized the importance ofmurmurs and thestethoscope, andemphasized the
global working ability of the heart. Whatever the cause (and infection ofone sort or
another was the most common proposed aetiology), the important final common
pathway was failure of cardiac reserve.38 While anatomical lesions could contribute
33 Ibid., p. 14, italics in original.
34Ibid., p. 13.
35 MRCAR, 1917-18, 4: 53.
36MRCAR, 1916-17, 3: 75.
37Ibid., p. 38.
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to weakening ofthe heart, the actual state ofthe cardiacmuscle could be ascertained
only by observing the response to effort. The effort syndrome therefore accurately
reflected the physiological emphasis on cardiac function.
Finally, the research carried on at Hampstead and reported by the MRC falls
naturally into two general categories. First, there were empirical, clinical
observations. These included studies on the response to carefully defined exercises,
recommendations on the proper terminology (emphasizing the value of not using
terms referring to heartdisease), and speculating on the presence ofmalingerers, the
effects of differences in class and occupation, and other practical points directly
related to the wartime need to get soldiers either back to the front or out of the
service. However, the hospital was to do far more than its supporters originally
intended. It was to use the soldier's heart as a setting in which to apply all manner of
physiological testing, and to serve as a first step in organized, centralized
governmental support ofmedical research. Intermingled with practical observations
was asecond, more physiological group ofstudies. These usedpatientswithsoldier's
heart to study such topics as buffer salts and their relationship to breathlessness, the
effects ofpilocarpine on sweating, the effects ofatropine, adrenalin andapocodeine,
and detailed studies ofurinary composition. Here, investigators made little effort to
relate the results of their studies to practical problems. It would appear that they
were using the availability of funds and clinical resources to pursue basic research,
with little effort made to link clinical findings with pharmacological or physiological
ones. Out ofwartime necessities came one ofthe first instances oforganized support
of basic science by the British government.
Two other diagnostic terms came into being during the war. One was
"shell-shock".39 Initially thought secondary to small cerebral haemorrhages,
shell-shock was, by the end of the war, ascribed to psychological causes. Soldier's
heart and shell-shock shared a number of medical and organizational features: both
were marked by breathlessness and nervous instability, were less common in men
previously accustomed to active, outdoor work, and regularly called into question
the possibility of malingering. Both also led to the creation of special boards and
special hospitals for study, and created post-war problems for the Ministry of
Pensions. It is striking how frequently soldier's heart is discussed by those writing
about shell-shock and how infrequently the reverse is true. The explanation may lie
in the somewhat lower status accorded to psychological theories of disease than
physiological or anatomical heart disease. Perhaps as a result, shell-shock was often
equated with malingering or cowardice, and the remedy was too often the firing
squad. While malingering was often an issue with soldier's heart too, these patients
seem not to have faced capital punishment.
The same set of symptoms that was renamed the "effort syndrome" in Great
38 Fora lucid description ofthe concept offailure ofcardiac reserve see Lewis, op. cit., note4 above,pp.
37-40, esp. fig. on p. 39.
" Report ofthe War Office Committee ofEnquiry into "Shell Shock", London, HMSO, 1922. Martin
Stone, 'Shell shock and the psychologists', in W.F. Bynum, Roy Porter, and Michael Shepherd (editors),
The anatomy ofmadness: essays in the history ofpsychiatry, vol. 2: Institutions and society, London,
Tavistock, 1985.
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Britain was called "neurocirculatory asthenia" in the United States.40 A group of
American physicians were sent to Colchester to make recommendations to the
Surgeon-General about heart disease in the armed forces. They worked in the same
military camps and at times saw exactly the same soldiers as their British
counterparts who described these soldiers as having "effort syndrome". The entity
"neurocirculatory asthenia" occurred in American soldiers during mobilization in
the USA, while the British soldiers usually became ill only after the stress of battle.
Ratherthan advocating gradedexercise and eventual return toduties, as wasadvised
by the British, American soldiers with neurocirculatory asthenia were treated with
rest and discharged to civilian life.4" That the Americans chose to create a different
disease with a different aetiology and therapy from the same set of symptoms
supports the importance of social settings, military needs, and national styles in the
construction of systems of disease.
MINISTRY OF PENSIONS
Military, economic, and political exigencies forcedthe MRCandthe WarOffice to
construct a wartime system ofhospitals and physicians in order to dealwith soldier's
heart. Although thissystem was nolessnecessary afterthe cessation ofhostilities, its
function changed from concern with rapid assessment and return of soldiers to
concern with thepost-wareconomicdrainfromthousands ofpensioned soldiers. The
Ministry ofPensions had been formed in December 1916; in February 1917, it took
overadministration ofdisability pensionsfrom the Admiralty.42 Longbefore the war
actually ended, British physicians and politicians appreciated the need for accurate
assessment of disability and feared the impending financial pressure of soldiers'
pensions.43 Soldier's heart commanded attention as the third most common reason
for disability, and the natural site for that attention was the Colchester Hospital.
By the war's end, Lewis was the obvious choice to guide the evaluation ofsoldiers
pensioned with heart disease. He was named honorary consulting physician in
cardiovascular disease to the Ministry ofPensions, and instituted "intensive courses
of instruction in pathology, diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis for pension
purposes" to train deputy commissioners for the Ministry.44 Some 150 deputy
commissioners were trained in these courses, and after the armistice, the War Office
continued to send RAMC officers to Colchester. In addition to training examiners,
until the spring of 1919, Colchester also functioned as a dispersal hospital for heart
cases. Boards of discharge and dispersal sat assessing "cardiovascular" cases for
pension purposes almost constantly around the end of the war, in one period of
intensive work evaluating some 150 cases per week.45
40 Samuel A. Levine, 'The origin ofthe term neurocirculatory asthenia', New Engl. J. Med., 1965, 273:
604-605; Harlow Brooks, 'Neurocirculatory asthenia', in The Medical Department ofthe United States
Army in the World War, vol. 9: Communicable and otherdiseases, prepared under the direction ofM.W.
Ireland by Joseph F. Siler, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1928, pp. 559-586.
41 Ibid., pp. 565. 582-584.
42 D.N. Chester, The organization of British central government 1914-64, London, Rosken House,
1968, p. 152.
43 MRCAR, 1916-17, 3: 75.
44 MRCAR, 1918-19, 5: 58.
45 Ibid., p. 57.
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Britain's financial situation was precarious afterthe unexpectedly long war, and it
rapidly worsened. Following the end of the war, the Ministry ofPensions expanded
rapidly. By 1920-21, it employed a staff of approximately 18,000 and controlled a
budget of £106,000,000, more than any other department of State.' By then, the
National Debt had risen to fourteen times the pre-war level and public expenditure
had doubled, to thirty percent ofthe national income.47 With theslump of 1921, the
search for economy reached "panic proportions".48 Outside observers ofthe British
pension system noted the very heavy financial burdens it placed on the country.49
Once again, attention wasfocused on soldiers with heartdisease. However, rather
than occupying hospital beds in wartime, these soldiers were receiving pensions for
theirdisease. Nonetheless, asoldierwith heartdisease hadmorechanceofsignificant
recovery than one of the many who had suffered penetrating wounds, or had
required amputation of an arm or a leg. By the time all of the ex-soldiers had been
assessed, over 1.3 million men were receiving pensions. Of these, about nine per
cent, or somewhat over 100,000, carried a diagnosis of heart disease. (The
percentage diagnosed with "heart disease" remained roughly constant from 1919 to
1928.) But, by the end of the war, the definition of heart disease had changed.
Neither the constellation ofsymptoms that made up soldier's heart northe presence
ofcardiac murmur alone was any longer sufficient evidence for disability (though to
some practitioners not yet acquainted with the work at Colchester a murmur alone
might still be considered sufficient evidence to label someone an invalid). The new
diagnosis of cardiac incapacity was to be based solely on the observed response to
effort. With these "new methods of diagnosis and treatment", large numbers of
soldiers were able to return to work and, presumably, would no longer require
pensions.50
Who was to make the decisions regarding pensions? Paradoxically, despite nearly
universal agreement by 1918 that the effort syndrome-whatever it was-was not
primarily a disease of the heart, and despite the same unanimity that the word
"heart" itself should be studiously avoided in reference or even in proximity to the
individuals in question, for fear of unduly alarming them and thereby impeding
recovery, it was to "specialists in diseases ofthe heart" that the Ministry ofPensions
turned for assistance in evaluating soldiers claiming to be victims ofthe disease. And
it was to be this group ofphysicians who later formed the nidus for the development
of British cardiology.
Lewis, honorary consulting physician in diseases of the heart to the Ministry,
supervised the formation of a unified, rationalized, and financially advantageous
system for dealing with heart cases:
Dr. Lewis'sserviceshavebeen made available at therequest ofthe MinistryofPensionsforwork
in reorganizing the assessment of cases ofcardiovasculardisability. During theearly part of 1919,
46Sir John A.R. Marriott, The mechanism ofthe modern state. A treatise on the science and art of
government, London, Oxford University Press, 1927, vol. 2, pp. 189, 193; 'Parlimentary intelligence',
Lancet, 1922, ui: 1255.
4 William Ashworth, An economic history ofEngland 1870-1939, London, Methuen, 1960, p. 389.
4 Ibid.
'Compensation for war disabilities in Great Britain and the United States', International Labor
Office, Geneva, Studies and reports: series E, no. 4, 1921.
50 'Work of the Pensions Ministry', Br. med. J., 1922, i: 68.
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he worked withthe Resurvey Boards ofthe London region, andgave instruction tothese boardsby
means of weekly lectures and demonstrations. ... on his appointment as Honorary Consulting
Physician in diseases of the heart to the Ministry, he recommended that cardiac specialists should
be appointed to carry on the instructional and assessment work at the Resurvey Boards under his
supervision, and that all heart cases should be seen by the General Boards in special sessions. An
outpatient clinic has been inaugurated at University College Hospital for reports upon and
treatment of heart cases specially selected by officers of the Resurvey Boards. Recently, on his
recommendation, bedshavebeensetaside attheMinistry'shospital atOrpingtonasaconvalescent
unitforcardiovascular cases. ... The assessment and care ofpensioners ofthecardiovascularclass
in the London region hasthus beenorganized in sucha way that the assessments havebeen revised
and brought to a uniform scale by officers specially trained for the purpose: facilities for special
reports and special or convalescent treatment have also been arranged, and the various
departments are now infull workingorder. Afeature ofthe scheme is that all the departments, the
Resurvey Boards, thespecial CardiacClinic, and the convalescentunit arecloselyintouch withone
another....
It has been estimated that the annual saving upon cardiovascular assessments in the London
region alone already amounts approximately to £46,000, and it is understood that the Ministry,
actingupon Dr. Lewis's recommendations, have nowappointed honoraryconsultantsindiseasesof
the heart to supervise the work similarly in other regions of the country.5"
This 1919-20 MRC report thus proposed an institutional apparatus that
reproduces much thatwe have come to associate with a medicalspeciality: agroup of
physicians with special training in "diseases of the heart", separate facilities, out-
patient as well as in-patient, where patients with heart disease would be seen, close
communication between all parts of the system, and a financial rationale for this
systematic care of patients with heart disease.
The only detailed case study for modern development of a medical speciality
remains George Rosen's work on ophthalmology. The MRCsystem fordealing with
heart disease describes three ofthe requirements Rosen postulated as necessary for
speciality development: large groups of patients with specific diseases, specialized
hospitals, and the financial resources to support a new group of specialists.52 These
three conditions held for at least the war and the period immediately following the
armistice. The fourth basis for speciality formation in Rosen's model, improved
technology, appears, surprisingly, to have played little part in Lewis's plan. Despite
his earlier advocacy forthe ECG, the effort syndrome was diagnosed and treated by
simple, non-technological open-air exercises. Certainly, some of the researchers at
Hampstead and Colchester had used other technology, to measure blood pressure
with the sphygmograph, heart size with the X-ray orthodiagram, the white blood cell
count, the blood carbon dioxide. But these observations were not considered
germane to management ofpatientswith the effortsyndrome. They were interesting
physiological observations, but not necessary for physicians taking care of patients.
Machines belonged in laboratories; physicians, it was thought, should rely on their
unaided senses.53
THE CARDIAC CLUB
Just as military needs brought togetherphysicians in hospitals to work onsoldier's
5 "MRCAR, 1919-20, 6: 30-31.
52 George Rosen, The specialization ofmedicine with particular reference to ophthalmology, 1944,
reprinted New York, Arno Press, 1972, pp. 28, 29.
5 Forfurther discussionofBritish attitudes towards the ECG see Joel D. Howell, 'Early perceptions of
the electrocardiogram: from arrhythmia to infarction', Bull. Hist. Med., 1984, 58: 83-98.
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heart during World War I, economicpressures led the Ministry ofPensions to gather
together British physicians interested in the heart. This group, the Cardiac Club,
formed to address specific and (as we shall see) transient post-war problems,
persisted longafterthe rationale foritsformation wasgone. Iteventually became the
leading British cardiology group, the CardiacSociety, and assuch warrantsattention
as a case study in early twentieth-century speciality formation.
The honorary consultants Lewis proposed to aid regional directors in assessing
cardiac cases were appointed in April 1920.54 In 1921, they met for the first time in
London, primarily to discuss technical and administrative matters pertaining to the
Ministry of Pensions. Howeve'r, more general matters were considered as well; the
group felt that the discussion had been of value "to themselves and perhaps to
cardiacscience" and thatthey should meet again underdifferent auspices.55 The first
organizational meeting of the Cardiac Club was held at Oxford a year later, on 22
April 1922, and the first annual meeting was held at University College London, on
22 November 1922, with Sir Thomas Lewis in the chair. Until transformation into
the Cardiac Society in 1937, the Cardiac Club met yearly on the day prior to the
meeting of the Association of Physicians of Great Britain and Ireland.
Although they were, by the endofthe war, the twophysicians mostassociated with
heart disease in Great Britain, neither Lewis nor Mackenzie played an active role in
the Cardiac Club. In 1922, after organizi-ng a group of cardiac consultants, Lewis
declared "the cream is offthe top" and left cardiac research.56 He never presented a
paper at the Cardiac Club and did no further work for the Ministry of Pensions.
When the new Cardiac Society founded theBritish HeartJournal in 1939, Lewiswas
asked to write the introduction to the first volume. He did so, but clearly from the
perspective of an outsider.57 Two years earlier, he had changed the title of his own
journal fromHeart to ClinicalScience, achange in namewhich reflected ashiftinthe
content of the journal.58 Although he played a seminal role in the formation of the
Cardiac Club, Lewis chose not to be a part of it. Why not?
Lewis perceived clinical research in a very different way from most Cardiac Club
members. After early difficulty in obtaining support for research, since 1916, Lewis
had been employed full-time by the MRC. In the 1919-20 MRC annual report, the
section on experimental medicine had been separated from the section on
cardiovascular diseases. By 1922, he was director of the newly established clinical
units at University College Hospital. Having cast hislot with the MRC, Lewiswasno
doubt attuned to the wishesofhis supporters within that organization. Anditis clear
that one of their priorities was practical results, findings that could be applied at the
bedside by the average practitioner. A 1926-27 summary ofLewis's research praises
his early work on the ECG and on soldier's heart, but then goes ontosay: "The work
" John Cowanetal., 'Some noteson the Cardiac Club', Br. HeartJ., 1939,1:97-103; Maurice Cambell,
'The British Cardiac Society and the Cardiac Club: 1922-1961', ibid., 1962, 24: 673-695.
Cowan, op. cit., note 54 above, p. 98.
58 G.E. Pickering, 'In memoriam, Thomas Lewis', Clinical Science, 1948, 6: 3-11.
5 Thomas Lewis, 'Foreword', Br. Heart J., 1939, 1: 1-2.
58 The last volume of Heart contains the final publication of research on soldier's heart started at
Hampstead Hospital. R.T. Grant, 'After-histories for ten years of 1000 men suffering from heart disease.
A study in prognosis', Heart, 1933, 16: 276-381.
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within disorders ofthe heart, an organlying deep within the body, compelled the use
of complex instruments and methods of great refinement, though happily it was
foundpossible totranslate almost all the discoveries so made intosimple methods of
observation for use at the bed-side."59 The most valuable experiments were those
done on patients using simple equipment; the most worthwhile findings were those
that could be applied at the bedside. Lewis turned his career to clinical research,
leaving behind the heart and the ECG.
JamesMackenzie, the onlyhonorary memberofthe CardiacClub, wasasymbolof
the club to many members. Some suggested that the Cardiac Club had been
"conceived in Burnley", Mackenzie's Lancashire home until 1907.60 However,
Mackenzievigorously opposedthe conceptofacardiacspecialist. The sameNational
Insurance Act that provided funds for Lewis through the MRC had also established
the general practitioner in the centre of the health care system.6" Mackenzie
advocated a return to general practice and thought research by the general
practitioner in "places remote from hospitals and laboratories" was medicine's only
hope for advancement."2 He advised Lewis to take a post as a general practitionerin
1917 (Lewis did not); an American visitor wishing advice from the world-renowned
heart specialist was surprised by Mackenzie's suggestion that his visitorshould train
for research by entering general practice for ten years.63
Mackenzie, the "patron saint of the general practitioner" thought specialization
was an affront to the essential unity of medicine," calling it "almost a hindrance to
progress. This is especiall) true in medicine. Moreover, a specialist is, by the nature
ofhiscalling, amanwith alimitedexperience, andtherefore hecanhave butalimited
outlook". Of men "devoting themselves entirely to the study of affectations of the
heart", Mackenzie thought that while this might appeal to the general public, it
showed a "complete misconception of the principles of medical practice".65 He
thought no more highly of those who regarded laboratory devices, such as the ECG
or his own polygraph, as the highest ideal. That conception was "superficial and
rudimentary". He wrote to Lewis: "If medicine is to make any progress at all, the
symptoms of disease must be detected by the unaided senses."66
In 1918, Mackenzie left London to found the St Andrews Institute for Clinical
Research, based on his concept ofresearch by general practitioners, in St Andrews,
Scotland. In his later writings, Mackenzie attempted to define yet another "new
59MRCAR, 1926-27, 13: 13.
Cowan, op. cit., note 54 above, p. 97.
61 George Newman, Recent advances in medical education in England, London, HMSO, 1923, p. 65;
Rosemary Stevens, 'The evolution of the health care system in the United States and the United
Kingdom', in Priorities for the use ofresources in medicine, Washington, DC, US Government Printing
Office, 1977, pp. 13-30.
62 Carter M. Smith sen., and Mark Siverman, 'A letter from Sir James Mackenzie to Dr. Carter Smith
(22 April 1924)', Circulation, 1975, 51: 212-217.
" Mackenzie to Lewis, 25 December 1917, Contemporary Medical Archives Centre, Wellcome
Institute for History of Medicine, London; Wilson, op. cit., note 12 above, p. 249.
"Rosen, op. cit., note 52 above, p. 63.
6 SirJames Mackenzie, 'The role ofmedicine at thebeginning ofthe twentieth centuryasillustrated by
the state of cardiology', New York med. J., 1922, 65: 61-66.
66 Mackenzie to Lewis, 22 January 1919, Contemporary Medical Archives Centre, Wellcome Institute
for the History of Medicine, London.
48"Soldier's heart"
cardiology" founded on early detection of disease and the principle of the reflex
arc.67 Neitherthis newline ofresearch northe St AndrewsInstitute longsurvived his
death.' But the Cardiac Club did survive. Moreover, it prospered; by 1935, no
member had resigned and all were present for the annual meeting. Eventually, the
club became the first British speciality group devoted to diseases of the heart. This
seems quite remarkable. First, the disease the club was formed to evaluate, soldier's
heart, was widely believed to be non-cardiac even before the group wasiormed.
Second, the problem that resulted in the group'sformation, the financial crisis at the
Ministry of Pensions, rapidly abated. From expenditures of£106,645,000 in 1921,
expenses dropped to £81,500,000 in 1923 and £63,450,000 in 1927.69 The club
could not survive centred on a cardiac problem of soldier's heart.
Who were these physicians who gatheredin 1922 toformthe CardiacClub? Their
careers are sketched in the Appendix.70 Many had expressed a particular interest in
heart disease even before World War I.71 Most were in their forties, many had early
experience in pathology or anatomy, and many went on to hold chairs in their home
institutions.
What was the source ofcohesion for the Cardiac Club? Ifthis wasindeed an early
speciality group, one might expect to see some common themes in their interests,
perhaps in research, or some new technology, as Rosen suggested for the
ophthalmoscope. One can make three observations about the publications of
67 Sir James Mackenzie, 'A new outlook in cardiology', Br. med. J., 1924, i: 1-5, 57-61, 104-109.
Itisinteresting that, although they were almost three decadesapartinage,bothLewisand Mackenzie
turned inthe 1920sfromthestudyoftheheartbygraphicmethodstothe studyofhumanpain. Giventheir
close personal relationship, that both should turn to the same area at the same time seems unlikely to be
coincidental, although the reason for their doing so is unclear. Could this relate to the heightened
Victorian sensitivity to pain, as discussed by James Turner, Reckoning with the beast: animals, pain and
humanity in the Victorian mind, Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980? Alternatively,
though related, could this be a reaction to the antivivisection forces that remained strongenough to draw
public speeches from Lewis, as in Thepractitioner's debtto research, London, Research Defence Society,
1927? OrdidthehumanbrutalityandpaininWorld WarIplaya role?Thequestionremainsunanswered.
9Annual Reports ofthe Ministry ofPensions, London, HMSO, 1922, 1924, 1928.
70 Unless otherwise stated, biographical information on members of the Cardiac Club is based on the
following:
Carey F. Coombs: Br. med. J., 1932, ii: 1126; Bristol med.-chir. J., 1932, 49: 326-328.
Thomas Cotton: Br. Heart J., 1966, 28: 137-138
J.G. Emanuel: ibid., 1958, 20: 579.
John Cowan: ibid., 1948, 10: 1.
A.G. Gibson: ibid., 1950, 13: 255.
Wardrop Griffith: ibid., 1947, 9: 77.
John Hay: ibid., 1959, 21: 573.
Lord Horder: ibid., 1955, 18: 123; St Bart's Hosp. J., 1957, 6: 247-250; Practitioner, 1963, 70:
532-537.
Sir William Errington Hume: Br. HeartJ., 1960, 22: 426; Lancet, 1960, i: 117-118; Br. med. J.,
1960, i: 132-133.
John E. Macllwaine: Lancet, 1930, ui: 428.
Sir John Parkinson: Br. Heart J., 1976, 38: 1105-1107.
William T. Ritchie: ibid., 1945, 7: 207.
Hubert John Starling: ibid., 1950, 13: 2581.
Kenneth Douglas Wilkinson: Br. Heart J., 1951, 14: 556.
See also, obituaries in Richard R. Trail (editor), Munk's Roll. LivesoftheFellows oftheRoyal Collegeof
Physicians ofLondon, vol. 5: continued to 1965, London, Royal College of Physicians, 1968.
71 Christopher Lawrence, 'Moderns and ancients: the "new cardiology" in Britain 1880-1930', this
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Cardiac Club members. (I am excluding Lewis and Mackenzie from these
generalizations.) First, there were few. The entire production of John Cowan, the
most prolific, was only thirty-one articles; by comparison, Lewis wrote over 250
articles and Mackenzie over 120. Second, they included almost no papers on animal
research or experimental medicine, such as the research carried out at Hampstead
and Colchester, or in Lewis's laboratories after the war.72 Rather, Cardiac Club
members mainly published an occasional case report. The third observation is that
the articles covered a wide range oftopics. Papers on the heart may be found, to be
sure, andThomasWardrop Griffithpublishedalmostexclusively oncardiacdiseases.
However, for the rest, case reports on cardiac topics alternate with the 'The
treatment of acute lobar pneumonia' or 'Syphilis of the lungs'."
On two occasions, discussions at the yearly meeting of the Cardiac Club led to
publication. Following Hay's discussion ofthe action ofquinidine on heart disease in
1923 and Gibson's on anaemic necrosis of the heart in 1925, the members shared
cases which were then published collectively in the Lancet.74 These two efforts were
clearly on cardiac topics. However, other than these case series, the members did
not collaborate in investigations, and there is no evidence to suggest that shared
research contributed to the survival of the club.
Nor was the primary source of cohesion an instrumental technology. One might
think the ECG would have been idealforthat purpose. It was a newtechnology used
to study an accepted cardiac problem, the irregular pulse. Furthermore, the ECG
was supplemented by a theory that provided scientific legitimation for its use.
However, while Cardiac Club memberswere frequently instrumental in bringing the
polygraph and ECG to their own institutions, they based neither the Club nor their
own professional careers on such technology. Several members supervised
cardiographic departments; none called himself a "cardiologist". ("Cardiographic"
inthe 1920sreferred tographicmethods ofanalysing the heartbeat-the polygraph or
ECG.) Over the fourteen years of its existence, the Cardiac Club heard thirty-four
presentations. Of these, only five dealt with topics amenable to instrumental
diagnosis, and only two of these presentations were made in the first ten years.
Attheirannualmeetings, asin theirpublications,the membersofthe CardiacClub
addressed a wide range of topics. There was no central theme. Of the thirty-four
topics discussed, there were five which dealt with instrumental methods, six on
infectious diseases, six on the effect of drugs on the heart (including tobacco and
72 Experimental medicine was thus defined by Lewis: "In experimenting we make observations, not
upon events that are happening quite spontaneously (observational method), but upon events that are
provoked or influenced by the interference of the experimenter." This remains a reasonable definition
today. 'The relationship ofclinical medicine to physiology from the standpoint ofresearch', inResearch in
medicine and other addresses, London, H.K. Lewis, [n.d.]; or Br. med. J., 1932, ii: 1046-1049.
73 John Hay, 'The treatment of acute lobar pneumonia', ibid., 1927, ii: 477; H.J. Starling, 'Syphilis of
the lungs', Quart. J. Med., 1939, 32: 381.
7 John Hay, 'The action of quinidine in the treatment of heart disease, based on the experiences of
certain members ofthe Cardiac Club',Lancet, 1924,ii: 543-545; Alexander George Gibson, 'The clinical
aspects of ischaemic necrosis of the heart muscle', ibid., 1925, ii: 1270-1275. Cary Coombs chose to Publish separately, along with Geoffrey Hatfield, 'Ischaemic necrosis of the cardiac wall', ibid., 1926, i:
14-15.
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alcohol), and sixteen (including the six on infectious diseases) on a heterogeneous
group of conditions, such as the heart in pregnancy or in pneumonia.75
The Cardiac Club eventually became a true speciality group, the Cardiac Society.
But, if the club had no unity of research, technology, or practice, was the Cardiac
Club itselfaspeciality group? Perhaps there was no hidden professional focusforthe
club. The members probably constituted a social group who enjoyed ayearly meeting
in which the shared professional discussion was only a minor component. Three
retrospective accounts of the club mention that "friendship" was an especially
important feature of the group.76 While this may be only rhetoric, the fact that all
three articles emphasize this point is suggestive."
Soldier's heart may have been the catalyst that brought the Cardiac Club into
being, but it was not the glue that held it together. If friendship was indeed the
primary reason for the survival of the club, then this case study demonstrates how a
group of physicians bound by social ties can act as the nucleus for later speciality
formation. The case study also demonstrates howwhat was aminorclinical problem
in the nineteenth century, heart disease in soldiers, became the focus of attention
during the First World War, and how the disease of soldier's heart was redefined in
military hospitals during the war.
For the British government, the redefinition of heart disease in soldiers was
"successful". By "successful" I mean that it was consistent with national needs
during World War I, both economically-by reducing the numberofdays spent in the
hospital; and politically-by increasing the number of soldiers already in the army
who could return to the front. During the redefinition of "soldier's heart" as the
"effort syndrome", the aetiology was moved from factors controlled by the army
(uniforms and drills) to underlying weaknesswithinthe individual (occultinfection).
At the same time, the Hampstead and Colchester hospitals represented the
beginnings of government support of basic scientific research.
The "effort syndrome" reappeared in the Second World War, but that is another
story. From the late nineteenth century until the end of the 1920s, heart disease in
soldiers serves as a window through which to view a changing medical world, a
medical world that ultimately mustinclude war,pensions, andtheyearlygathering of
men who would, eventually, become cardiologists.
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